Location: BUG, Biblioteca Universitaria di Genova, via Balbi 40, Genova

Here you may find the provisional program of the Rolling Seminar 2018.
On the right side of the table, you will find the .pfd or the titles of the papers to be used as a basis for discussion during the 4-hours session of the corresponding day.

Argumentation seminar will be held by Cristina Amoretti and Margherita Benzi.

For references of the Argumentation Seminar and the Rolling Seminar see below.


Argumentation- Rollingseminar Speakers
Febr. 02  Argument1
11-13 14-18 Tommaso Piazza (Thought Experiments) 1. Williamson7-1,+ 7-6
2.Goldman + Gettier
9  Argument-2
11-13 14-18 Daniela Steila: how can we study different
philosophical cultures and their interactions?
2. DeBlasio_2011
16 Argument-3
11-13 14-18 Filippo Magni (Free Will)  1. Ayer
2. Frankfurt
23 Argument 4
11-13 14-18. Luca Fonnesu (Moral Responsibility)  1. Strawson1962
March 02 Delayed –> 9 11-13 14-18 Enrico Pasini & Paolo Tripodi (History of thought)Delayed ->30 march? 1. MortonWhite
11-13 14-18 Luca Vanzago (Phenomenology)  1. Husserl-I-§§ 27-46
16 Naturalisic Fallacy 14-18 Massimiliano Vignolo (Intuition) 1. Machery + C-L§
2. Deutsch09+ 010
23 Giunta 14-18 Maurizio Pagano (Hermeneutics) 1.Interpretazione

             30                                                          11-16 Enrico Pasini & Paolo Tripodi (History of thought)


Here below the sources of discussion papers.

February 2:

  1. T. Williamson, The Philosophy of Philosophy, Ch. 7 (“Evidence in Philosophy”), Sect. 1, 6.
  2.  A. Goldman, “Philosophical Intuitions. Their target, their source, and their epistemic status”, Grazer Philosophische Studien 74, 2007, 1-26
  3. E. Gettier, “Is justified true belief knowledge?Analysis 23 (6), 1963

February 9:

  1. Evert van der Zweerde, “Where is the common ground? Interaction and transfer between European and Russian philosophical culture”, in Studies in East European Thought, vol. 62, No. 3/4 (2010), pp. 259-277).
  2. Alyssa DeBlasio, “Writing the history of Russian philosophy”, in Studies in East European Thought, Vol. 63, No. 3 (August 2011), pp. 203-226)

February 16:

  1. A.J. Ayer “Freedom and Necessity”, in A. Ayer, Philosophical Essays, London, Mcmillan 1954: 271-284.
  2. H. Frankfurt, “Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility”; Journal of Philosophy, 66/23, 1969: 829-939
    (both can be found in Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will, Oxford University Press 1982.

February 23:

  1. P.F. Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment”, in P.F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays, London: Routledge, 1962.

March 2:

  1. White, Morton. “Why Annalists of Ideas Should be Analysts of Ideas.” The Georgia Review4 (1975): 930-947.
    but see also:  Cuttica, Cesare, “Intellectual History”, Int. Encycl.Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2nd ed. 2015
    Smith, Justin E. H., The Philosopher. Six types, Princeton University Press, 2016
  2. Moretti, Franco, Graphs, Maps, Trees, Abstract models for Literary History, New Left Review, 24, 2003

March 16:

Argument Seminar: Proposal for discussing an argument and a counter argument:

(1) John Searle: How to derive Ought from “is” (1964)
(2) Charles Pigden: Hume on His and Ought (2010)

The so-called “Naturalistic fallacy” has many formulations. We take it as a case of the “is to ought” problem devised by Hume. Two main attacks have been proposed against the Humean view, a logical one, by Arthur Prior (“The Autonomy of Ethics”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1960 38: 199–206;discussed by more than 150 papers) and a pragmatic one, by John Searle (“How to derive ought from is”, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 73, No. 1 (Jan., 1964), pp. 43-58, discussed or quoted by more than 800 papers or books). I propose to read Searle’s paper and a criticism by Charles Pigden (“Hume on His and Ought” in The Oxford Handbook of Hume). As background, it might be useful to read a historical account of the term “Naturalistic Fallacy” (Lorrain Daston, “The Naturalistic Fallacy is modern”. Isis 2014, 105: 579-587) and a very introductory essay (apart § 3.3 with some logic) by Edgard Morscher, “The Descriptive-Normative Dichotomy and the so-called Naturalistic Fallacy”, Analyse & Kritik 2016, 38: 317-337).

  1. E. Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, vol. 1, §§ 27-46.

March 16:

  1. Machery, E. et al. ‘Semantics, cross-cultural style’, Cognition 92(3): B1-B12.
    But see also: Cap 7 di Cappelen, H. Philosophy without intuitions, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012
  2. Deutsch, M. ‘Intuitions, counter-examples, and experimental philosophy’, Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1(3): 447-460.
    But see also: Deutsch, M. ‘Experimental philosophy and the theory of reference’, Mind and Language 24(4): 445-466.

March 23:

  1. Pagano, M. “Interpretazione e concetto nell’ermeneutica interculturale” (pro manuscripto)
  2. Pagano, M. “Differenze nell’universalitĂ . Questioni filosofiche nell’orizzonte della globalizzazione”, Annuario Filosofico, 2006 (22), Milano, Mursia, 2007, pp. 61-79.