Ciclo: 34
Curriculum/Indirizzo: Etico-Politico
Convenzione: NO-B

Tutor: Ottonelli Valeria
Supervisor: Vaccarezza Maria Silvia

Email: ceccodario@gmail.com

Progetto: Intuition and Moral Knowledge
  • November 2018 - ongoing: PhD in Philosophy. FINO Consortium, Università di Genova. Supervisor: Maria Silvia Vaccarezza
  • February 2018 - June 2018: Erasmus+ Traineeship. University of Leeds, Leeds. Supervisor: Pekka Vayrynen.
  • September 2015 - November 2017: MA degree in Philosophy. Università di Pisa, Pisa. Dissertation Title: "L'argomento di indispensabilità epistemica a favore del realismo normativo". Supervisors: Luca Bellotti, Massimo Mugnai. Grade: 110/110 cum laude
  • October 2015 - September 2017: Scholar of Scuola Normale Superiore, Class of Humanities. Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa.
  • September 2012 - July 2015: BA degree in Philosophy. Università degli Studi di Firenze, Firenze. Dissertation title: "Verità e norme: il valore di logico degli enunciati normativi". Supervisor: Pierluigi Minari. Grade: 110/110 cum laude.
  • September 2007 - July 2012: High school diploma. Liceo Scientifico Leonardo da Vinci, Firenze


ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0943-5898

Full CV


(2021) “Experiencing the conflict: the rationality of ambivalence.” The Journal of Value Inquiry. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-021-09859-1
(2021), "Dual-Process Reflective Equilibrium: Rethinking the Interplay between Intuition and Reflection in Moral Reasoning", Philosophical Explorations 24(3): 295-311. DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2021.1923785
(2020), (with Francesco Emanuelli), “Percezione morale”, APhex 22. URL: http://www.aphex.it/index.php?Temi=557D03012202740321050401777327
(2020), "Problems for Hard Moral Particularism: Can We Really Dismiss General Reasons?", Philosophical Inquiries, 8(2): 31-46. DOI: 10.4454/philinq.v8i2.256


First-year report
Second-year report
Third-year report

Project Abstract:
Moral intuition is a well-studied psychological phenomenon in which, after the observation of a particular event, a moral belief is formed by an automatic and unconscious mental process. For instance: one observes two children that torture a cat, then one immediately forms the belief that what they are doing is wrong, without the need of reflecting upon the situation or inferring the judgment from other beliefs that count as knowledge. Currently, there is a converging interest in the topic of moral intuition in three different research areas: moral epistemology (or metaethics in general), moral psychology, and virtue theory. One of the aims of my project is to integrate these different kinds of literature to get a comprehensive theoretical account of moral intuition that would fill the specific research gaps of the three areas. Therefore, I will investigate: which kind of experience moral intuition is (phenomenological question), which is the role of intuition for moral knowledge (epistemological question), and how moral intuition can be educated and trained (normative question).

Research Interests: Metaethics, Moral Epistemology, Moral Psychology, Virtue Theory, Philosophy of emotions.