

Sense, Reference and Hybridity

Reflections on Kripke's Recent Reading of Frege

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ABSTRACT

In his paper on 'Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference' Saul Kripke remarks: "Like the present account, Künne stresses that for Frege times, persons, etc. can be part of the expression of the thought. However, his reading is certainly not mine in significant respects . . ." On both counts, he is right. As regards the differences between our readings, in some respects I shall confess to having made a mistake, in several others I shall remain stubbornly unmoved. Thus I shall insist on the need for distinguishing Fregean sense from linguistic (lexico-grammatical) meaning, I shall resist Kripke's function-theoretic account of 'hybrid' thought-expressions, and I shall deplore his transformation of Gottlob Frege into Gottrand Fressell. As regards this transformation, I shall argue that some of the main points Kripke wants to drive home do not depend on it.

This paper is in part about expressions Russell once called egocentric, but I should warn the reader at the outset that as a whole it is also somewhat egocentric. Saul Kripke's paper 'Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference: Some Exegetical Notes'¹ contains a long footnote that has become dear to my heart. Half of it is about Tyler Burge (1979/2005), and the other half runs as follows:

Dagfinn Føllesdal has called my attention to the writings of Wolfgang Künne of which Künne (1992) is a representative example.

[K₁] Like the present account, Künne stresses that for Frege times, persons, etc. can be part of the expression of the thought.

However, his reading is certainly not mine in significant respects. For example, [K₂] he agrees with Burge that Frege's *Sinn* is not meaning, and concludes that Frege has no term for linguistic meaning.

[K₃] Nor, at least here, does he say anything about my doctrine of acquaintance *Sinne* for autonomous designation.

[K₄] I should add where demonstration is involved, as in pointing, to me it is clearly the act of demonstration, not the object designated (as in Künne), which is part of the expression of the *Gedanke*. The object itself is the *Bedeutung*, and the *Sinn* is the rule connecting a demonstration such as pointing to its object (Kripke, 202–203).

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¹ Based on a transcript of a lecture Kripke gave in Stockholm in 2001, on the occasion of the award of the Rolf Schock Prize in Logic and Philosophy, it was published only in 2008. Bracketed references in the text are always to this paper (unless they are to Frege's works).

I have adorned Kripke's text with numerals, for I shall organize my discussion of his paper, or rather of some parts of it, around his remarks in this footnote. In some respects, I shall confess to having made a mistake, in several others I shall remain stubbornly unmoved, and I hope to convince you that there are good reasons both for my yieldingness and for my obstinacy.

Kripke's point [K₁], or a shared conviction

Here are a couple of Fregean remarks that both Kripke and I (and hardly anyone else)² deem to be worthy of being taken literally. The first three are from 'Der Gedanke' (1918), and they are also quoted by Kripke. The pertinent passage in Frege's paper begins with a one-sentence summary of the account of 'colouration (*Färbung*)' that precedes it:

[F₁] Thus the content (*Inhalt*) of a sentence often goes beyond the thought expressed by it. But the opposite often happens too; the mere wording (*der bloße Wortlaut*), which can be made permanent by writing or the gramophone, does not suffice for the expression of the thought . . . If a time-indication is conveyed by the present tense one must know (*wissen*) when the sentence was uttered (*ausgesprochen*) in order to grasp the thought correctly. Therefore the time of utterance (*die Zeit des Sprechens*) is part of the expression of the thought (*Teil des Gedankenausdrucks*).³ . . .

[F₂] In all such cases the mere wording (*der bloße Wortlaut*), as it can be preserved in writing, is not the complete expression of the thought (*der vollständige Ausdruck des Gedankens*); the knowledge (*Kenntnis*) of certain circumstances (*Umstände*) accompanying the utterance (*das Sprechen*), which are used as means of expressing the thought (*als Mittel des Gedankenausdrucks*), is needed for us to grasp the thought correctly (Frege 1918, 64, original pagination).

If we take [F₁₋₂] literally then some thought-expressions contain more than meets the ear. Suppose Gottlob utters the sentence

² I know of two exceptions: Salmon (2002), who records indebtedness to observations made by Kripke in a seminar at Princeton, and Textor (2007), who came across this interpretation in seminars at Hamburg University. However, unlike Kripke and myself, Textor takes the hybridity view to be defensible only when applied to thought-expressions that contain *demonstratives*.

³ Towards the end of the paper Frege again emphasizes this point: "The wording 'This tree is covered with green leaves' is not sufficient by itself to constitute the expression (*Ausdruck*) [sc. of a thought], for the time of utterance belongs to it as well" (1918, 76, original pagination). (Burge (1979/2005, 233 f) mistranslates 'Ausdruck' as 'utterance'.)

(s1) It is raining in Jena.

Then, according to [F₁₋₂], what expresses a thought is a *mixtum compositum* consisting of Gottlob's utterance of (s1) and the time of his speaking. Because of the strange make-up of such thought-expressions I have called them *hybrid*.⁴

Here is what Frege says about utterances in which the first-person-singular pronoun is employed:

[F₃] In the mouth of different men the same wording (*Wortlaut*⁵) containing the word 'I' will express different thoughts of which some may be true, others false (1918, 64).

[F₄] The mere words [sc. 'I am cold'] do not contain the whole sense (*den ganzen Sinn*), but it is also a matter of who utters them. There are many cases like this in which the spoken word has to be supplemented by the speakers's gestures, direction of view, and the accompanying circumstances (*begleitende Umstände*) . . . [T]he same sentence does not always express the same thought, because the words need to be supplemented to yield a complete sense (*einen vollständigen Sinn*) ('Logic', 1897, (1967, 146) and (1979, 134–135)).

Suppose the notorious Dr. med. Gustav Lauben utters the sentence

(s2) I have blood-type 0.

Continuing in the spirit of [F₁₋₂] one should say: here, too, what expresses a thought is hybrid, – it consists of Lauben's utterance of (s2) and the doctor himself *in propria persona*.

What is the 'etc.' in [K₁] meant to cover? Noticing that you are shivering all over with cold somebody remarks soothingly,

(s3) The temperature here is not always below the freezing point.

If we follow the lines of [F₁₋₂] we should again characterize the thought-expression as hybrid: it contains not only an utterance of (s3) but also the *place* at which it is uttered. Note that in all three cases the *thought* is partly about a component of the *thought-expression*, just as the thought expressed in line

(ln₁) The first word-inscription in (ln₁) consists of 3 letters

⁴ For the first time in my (1982, 63 ff).

⁵ In their translations of 'Der Gedanke', the Quintons and Peter Geach (whose translation is reprinted in Beaney's (1997) collection and quoted by Kripke, 200 ff) make Frege talk here of the same *utterance*, and the same holds for the translation of this passage in Burge (1979/2005, 214). One may wonder, though Burge and Kripke do not seem to do so, how one utterance can manage to be in two mouths. As a matter of fact, Frege uses the very same term here as in [F₁₋₂], 'Wortlaut', not 'Äußerung'. In Kripke, 204, line 4, the first occurrence of 'complete' should be deleted. (It is not in the Geach translation.)

is about a piece of the thought-expression. So far Kripke's and my account of Frege's conception of indexicality coincide.

Here are two more passages that supply grist to the mill of the hybridity view.⁶ They also explain the second sentence in [F₄].

[F₅] I can use the words 'this man' to designate now this man, now that man. But still on each single occasion I want to designate just one man . . . The sentence that I utter does not always contain everything that is required; something has to be supplied by the context (*Umgebung*), by the gestures I make and the direction of my eyes . . . A concept-word combined with the demonstrative pronoun . . . often in this way has the logical value (*Wert*) of a proper name in that it serves to designate a single determinate object. But then it is . . . the whole consisting of the concept-word together with the demonstrative pronoun and accompanying circumstances (*begleitende Umstände*) which has to be understood as a proper name ('Logic in Mathematics', 1914, (1967, 230) and (1979, 213)).

The earliest piece of evidence for the hybridity view is to be found in a draft of 'Über Begriff und Gegenstand':

[F₆] In the sentence 'That is Saturn' we have two proper names for the same object. For the word 'that', together with an appropriate ostension (*Hinweisung*), must here be construed as a proper name (in the logical sense) i.e. as a sign for an object ('Discussion of Kerry', 1887, (1967, 100) and (1979, 91)).

When Gottlob says, pointing at a tree in front of his house in Jena,

(s4) That is a lime tree,

the thought-expression is again hybrid. What is its non-verbal component? [F₅] strongly suggests, and [F₆] clearly says, that it is a deictic act. So here we have another item that Kripke's 'etc.' in [K₁] is meant to cover.

The argument for the hybridity view given in the second half of [F₁] and alluded to in the last sentence of [F₂] is enthymematic. The implicit second premiss is something like this:

(Pr+) If one cannot properly grasp the thought T expressed in a certain context unless one knows (*kennt*) the context element C, then C is *part of* the expression of T.

⁶ Kripke quotes none of [F₄₋₆]. In my (1992) I had missed passage [F₆].

I regard talk of 'context elements' as slightly more appropriate than Frege's talk of 'accompanying circumstances' in [F_{2.4.5}].⁷ Be that as it may, both phrases are meant to cover the time of an utterance, its place, its producer and acts of ostension. The additional premiss needs defence, for one may very well wonder why we should not follow Kaplan *e tutti quanti* and replace the consequent of (Pr+) by Relativization:

(Rel) the words that are used express T *with respect to* (or, *accompanied by*) C.

Kripke does not pause to defend (Pr+), and neither shall I. Let me just briefly mention a pertinent consideration. If one takes the relation of *expressing* to be dyadic, one has to endorse (Pr+). For if in cases like (s1–4) the thought-expression is not hybrid then a three-place predicate like the one in (Rel) is required, and if a sentence is multiply indexical, then at least *prima facie* a more-than-three-place predicate is needed. (Some of Frege's own examples are of this type: 'I am cold', 'I was wounded', 'This tree is covered with green leaves'.) Frege avoids this by taking the relevant context elements to be part of the thought-expression. Friends of Relativization can preserve triadicity by letting a *sequence* of context elements occupy the third position.

As regards utterances that contain demonstratives I made a mistake, and Kripke is clearly right.⁸ So let me jump to the last part of my favourite footnote.

Kripke's point [K₄], and Künne's recantation

Kripke simply opposes his view to mine, without telling us why he takes Künne to be wrong. So let me say why *I* have come to reject my earlier view. In 1992 I thought that Frege needs some bolstering up at this point. What worried me was the fact that demonstratives sometimes do not need the support of a pointing gesture. Just think of a motionless speaker, saying with closed eyes 'This is a horrible noise (disgusting smell)'. I should have taken this observation to be a reason for seeking a broader notion of ostension, but I actually took it to be a reason for assimilating case (s4) to its predecessors by taking the *object* the speaker of (s4) refers to – a tree if all goes well – to be the non-verbal part of the thought-expression. So once again, the thought expressed would be partly about a component of its expression. I quoted remarks by Wittgenstein and Schlick, such as "If we say of an object, 'This is 3 ft. high', then the object is part of the symbol" or "Remember that 'This is short' . . . without the thing we are pointing to would be

⁷ I have inserted the German verb '*kennen*' in order to remain close to the text of [F₂] where the corresponding verbal noun occurs. Unlike '*wissen* (know that, know wh-)' this verb is not clausal but transitive. Towards the end of this paper we will see that this philological detail is of philosophical interest.

⁸ As was Textor in his (2007, 955–956).

meaningless” (1992, 726–727), and then I went on to present my misreading of Frege as “spelling him out along Viennese lines” (which sounds like doing him a favour). I noticed a consequence of this reading: if the speaker of (s4) were hallucinating then we would have to say that only a fragment of a thought-expression came into being, something that fails to express a thought. This should have given me pause because Frege repeatedly emphasized: if a speaker does not succeed in picking out an object when uttering “this blade of grass”, “this lime tree”, or “this rainbow” (Frege’s examples), she “lapses into fiction”, i.e. her utterances do express thoughts but these thoughts are neither true nor false (1893, XXI; 1918, 68; 1919, 146). Surely he would have said the same thing about a hallucinatory utterance of (s4) or about a hallucinating murderer’s saying ‘Is this a dagger that I see before me?’.

And what about the motionless speaker who says with closed eyes, ‘This is a horrible noise (disgusting smell)’? We can take this to be a limiting case of an act of ostension: the act coincides with uttering that sentence, since the utterance suffices for making the topic of the thought salient.⁹

Kripke’s final statement in [K₄], “the *Sinn* is the rule connecting a demonstration such as pointing to its object”, presupposes a part of his doctrine I shall go into later, namely that the non-verbal part of a hybrid thought-expression has a Fregean sense. He does not pause to formulate the rule, but presumably he takes it to be something like this: ‘An act of ostension has for its demonstratum, if anything, the object the agent deliberately makes salient by her act’.

Kripke’s point [K₂], or does Fregean sense coincide with linguistic meaning?

I think that Kripke makes a serious mistake when he answers this question affirmatively, but I also think that his attack on a particular argument for the negative answer, to be found in Tyler Burge’s 1979 paper ‘Sinning against Frege’¹⁰ and at various places in my own work since 1982 (including the paper Kripke quotes), is entirely successful. Let me begin with the bad argument in Burge and Kühne. Here is its *Tempus praesens* version. First premiss. Frege takes utterances of (s1) at different times to express different senses. Second premiss. But the linguistic meaning of (s1) does not change all the time. Conclusion: Fregean sense differs from linguistic meaning. (The *Ego* and *Hic* versions of the bad argument run along similar lines.)

I never had any excuse for endorsing this argument, since I ascribed the hybridity view to Frege. The first premiss is plainly false. By Frege’s lights,

⁹ I endorse Textor’s solution of my puzzle: see his (2007, 956–957).

¹⁰ Burge (1979/2005, 214–216). The argument recurs in his (1990/2005, 245) and in the ‘Introduction’ to his (2005, 36).

utterances of (s1) at different times express the same sense, but this sense is *incomplete* in not being a complete thought, i.e. in not being a thought (p. 209). Recall [F₄]: “The mere words do not contain the *whole* sense . . .”.

Now sometimes people offer bad arguments for a true claim, and this is a case in point. Burge claimed that ‘the identification of Frege’s notion of sense with the notion of linguistic meaning’ betrays a fundamental misunderstanding, and I concurred. Kripke’s gentle mockery about this contention seems to me to be entirely misplaced: “surely, the ‘misunderstanding’, if there is one, is indeed a common one” (p. 200). Now Burge’s defence can be left to himself. When I claim that Fregean sense is not to be identified with linguistic meaning, the thesis is that it differs from *lexico-grammatical meaning*, from something that synonymous sentences such as ‘That is a drake’ and ‘That is a male duck’ have in common, from something that good translators try hard to preserve. This folk-semantical concept, I dare say, deserves Kripke’s epithet “the ordinary notion of meaning” (p. 201). Now one only has to read those pages in ‘Der Gedanke’ that precede [F₁₋₃] in order to see that Fregean sense does not coincide with lexico-grammatical meaning. For on those pages Frege contends (i) that a sentence beginning with ‘It is true that’ has the same sense as the sentence without that prologue and (ii) that a yes-no interrogative expresses the same thought as the corresponding declarative sentence. In the passage that immediately precedes [F₁₋₃] and that is summarized in the first sentence of [F₁] Frege maintains that corresponding instances of (iii) ‘Fortunately (*Gottlob* [!]), *p*’ and ‘*p*’ express one and the same thought. Now in each of the three pairs of sentences I mentioned the lexico-grammatical meanings of their members differ. If your teacher of German is worth his money he will castigate you for rendering not only ‘Snow is white’ as ‘Schnee ist weiß’ but also ‘It is true that snow is white’, ‘Is snow white?’ and ‘Fortunately, snow is white’. Kripke criticizes Burge for not noting “the odd omission in Frege, if *Sinn* is not meaning, of any technical term for the ordinary notion of meaning” (p. 201), and in this respect he seems to be less displeased with my paper, because it acknowledges this consequence. But the claim that Frege “owes us a technical term for meaning in the ordinary sense” (fn. 56) is a *petitio*: it takes for granted that Frege wants to give us a theory of meaning, that is, of lexico-grammatical meaning for logically imperfect languages like German or English.

Frege even came close to giving us a term for lexico-grammatical meaning. Consider the use of the word ‘content’ in the first statement of [F₁] and the contrast Frege is driving at when he goes on to claim, “But the opposite often happens too”.¹¹ According to these statements the following contrast obtains: in grasping the content of an utterance of (A), ‘Unfortunately, it is raining in Jena on June 1,

¹¹ Before 1890 Frege had used the word ‘content’ for a very different purpose (or for several). In ‘Der Gedanke’ it also occurs in the context of ‘content of consciousness’. So I’d better not claim that in [F₁] he introduces ‘content’ as a technical term.

1918', you grasp *more* than the thought expressed by it, whereas in grasping the content of an utterance of (B), 'It is raining', you grasp *less* than the thought expressed. In both cases the content that is grasped seems to come close to the lexico-grammatical meaning of the sentence that is uttered. It is because of the proper name in (A) that I am deliberately vague here. If the sense that is expressed by 'Jena' in an utterance of (A) is identical with, or contained in, the content of this name, then this content is not identical with the linguistic meaning of the name (if it has any): the former might differ from speaker to speaker, while the latter (if there is such a thing¹²) does not. It is tempting to identify the linguistic meaning of an indexical sentence like (B) with its incomplete Fregean sense, and Kripke may have yielded to this temptation. I think we should withstand it: the sentences 'It is raining', 'It is true that it is raining', 'Is it raining?' and 'Fortunately, it is raining' have *different* lexico-grammatical meanings, but according to Frege they have the *same* incomplete sense.¹³

Kripke's point [K₃] explained and called into question

Eighteen years ago I did indeed 'not say anything' about Kripke's "doctrine of acquaintance *Sinne* for autonymous designation", and I think I can be forgiven for this, since I came across his doctrine only a few months ago. The doctrine is a daring development of the hybridity view. Let me first try to explain it and then give my reason for not endorsing it. (In the course of my explanation I shall incidentally give point to Kripke's caution – note the phrase "at least here" in [K₃] – as to whether the doctrine is entirely alien to me.)

If one wants to explain Kripke's doctrine one has to enter his highly illuminating discussion of Frege's account of quotation, for this is the original habitat of his notion of autonymous designation. So let us forget about hybrid thought-expressions for a while and scrutinize (some of) Frege's remarks on *Oratio recta* or direct discourse in 'Über Sinn und Bedeutung' (1892a)¹⁴ and Kripke's interpretation thereof:

[F₇] If words are used in the ordinary way, what one intends to speak of (*wovon man sprechen will*) is their *Bedeutung*. It can also happen,

¹² Perhaps it coincides with that of 'the town called Jena'. (I doubt that this hypothesis has been refuted in *Naming and Necessity*, for being called N [*N heißen*] seems to me to be a social property.)

¹³ All this should be taken into account if one wants to compare Kaplan's notion of the 'character' of indexical sentences (to which Kripke alludes on p. 201) with Frege's notion of their incomplete sense and the intuitive notion of their linguistic meaning. (The remark about the temptation and this footnote respond to a question of one of the referees.)

¹⁴ I scrutinize all pertinent remarks (and the tension between them) in my (2010, 282–288).

however, that one wishes to talk about the words themselves . . . This happens, for instance, in direct discourse . . . ('On Sense and Reference', op. 28.)

[F₈] A sentence in direct discourse designates (*bedeutet*) again a sentence. (ibid., 36.).¹⁵

As a paradigm case of quotation ('for instance') Frege considers in [F₇] the kind of quotation in which somebody else is quoted, *Oratio recta*:

(*Recta*) When Caesar was about to cross the Rubicon, he said *verbatim*, 'alea iacta est'.

According to [F₇₋₈] the signs that are designated here are Caesar's words, a sentence, and what designates those words is also a sentence. Now the sequence of signs in (*Recta*) that begins and ends with quotation marks, isn't a sentence. But then, in an oral report there would be no such marks. If we stick to [F₇₋₈], the Latin sentence in (*Recta*) is used to refer to itself. Using a term that had been captured by Carnap in his *Logische Syntax der Sprache* (1934) for the same purpose, Kripke says that in the context of (*Recta*) the Latin sentence is *autonomous*, i.e. self-

¹⁵ My own translation. In his quarrel with Burge, Kripke seems to think that he needs an excuse for having quoted, in *Naming and Necessity*, Herbert Feigl's rather than Max Black's translation of 'Über Sinn und Bedeutung' (pp. 208–209). [There are two trivial historical mistakes in Kripke's remarks about these translations. He claims that Feigl's was earlier than Black's (p. 208), but Black's translation was first published in 1948, Feigl's in 1949. And he claims that Carnap in his (1947/1956) followed Feigl in translating 'Bedeutung' as 'nominatum' (p. 182), but, as Feigl himself explicitly said, it was the other way round.] As a matter of fact, in many respects Feigl's translation is superior to Black's. Apparently, the wide circulation of the latter has made many anglophone philosophers deaf to quite a few oddities. Thus all through his 2008 paper Kripke talks of 'direct' vs. 'indirect *quotation*', and so do many other writers on Frege. This confusing terminology is due to Black's mistranslation of Frege's opposition 'gerade' vs. 'ungerade Rede'. Feigl got it right: 'direct' vs. 'indirect discourse'. Kripke complains that "Frege says 'In direct quotation, a sentence designates *another* sentence . . .'" (p. 193, his emphasis), for he rightly takes this to be in tension with [F₇]. But this is not what Frege says – it is what Black makes him say. What Frege does say is [F₈].

As regards the delicate issue of how to translate 'Bedeutung', Kripke makes a suggestion which should be quickly forgotten. He rightly says that in Frege's mouth 'bedeuten' and 'bezeichnen' (designating) are stylistic variants, and he concludes from this that no translational worries would ever have arisen if Frege had used the verbal noun corresponding to the latter verb, i.e. 'Bezeichnung', rather than 'Bedeutung' (p. 181). That is a plain error about German: a Bezeichnung is a sign, so this was no option for Frege. But there was an option in the near neighbourhood: In 'Über Sinn und Bedeutung' Frege himself used the nominalized PPP of the verb 'bezeichnen', namely 'das Bezeichnete (the designatum)' when he introduced his technical term 'Bedeutung' (1892a, 26). Impressed by Beaney's hermeneutical stroke of genius, I shall use his homophonous translation of 'Bedeutung'.

naming (p. 192).¹⁶ When one turns to quotation in writing, this conception seems to be incompatible with the view Frege formulates in a draft of a letter dated 28.01.1914 to Philipp Jourdain:

[F₉] If I want to say something in writing about a written sign I enclose it in quotation marks, and the complex sign that is built up in this way (*das so entstandene zusammengesetzte Zeichen*) is a name of a sign (1976, 133).

According to this view, (*Recta*) contains a non-autonomous name of a sign: a singular term that is used to refer to something else, namely to a sentence. The incompatibility is only apparent if the following claim can be upheld: in (*Recta*) there is a non-autonomous designator that contains an autonomous designator, and they both designate the same thing. After all, the definite description ‘the square of 1’ also contains a part that designates what the whole phrase designates.

If in line (*Recta*) a Latin sentence is used to refer to itself, does it designate the token of a Latin sentence that is visible in that line? If that were so, the inscription in the next line,

(ln₂) ‘alea iacta est’ = ‘alea iacta est’

would express a glaring falsehood rather than a trivial truth, and in the next two lines

(ln₃) ‘alea iacta est’ consists of three words

(ln₄) ‘alea iacta est’ consists of three words

different truths would be expressed. This does not go well with our practice of quoting. So Hans Reichenbach was well advised when he invented a special kind of quotation marks, *token quote-marks*, for constructing designators of token expressions.¹⁷ The inscription in the next line

(ln₅) ♣alea iacta est♣ = ♣alea iacta est♣

does indeed express a falsehood. I think we should spell out Frege’s claim that in (*Recta*) words are used to talk about themselves along the following lines: in (*Recta*) a sentence token designates the (orthographically individuated) Latin sentence of which it is a token. (The proviso ‘orthographically individuated’ is meant to allow us to accept as true a remark like this: ‘One billion is 10¹²’ expresses a truth in British English and a falsehood in American English.)

Let us call the *Bedeutung* a sentence has when it is used quotationally its quotational reference. The quotational reference of a sentence token is the very

¹⁶ “[Einen] als Bezeichnung für ihn selbst . . . verwendeten Sprachausdruck nennen wir *autonym*” (Carnap 1934, 109). As Kripke notes (fn. 39), this view of *Oratio recta* had been ascribed to Frege already by Church, Kaplan and Washington.

¹⁷ Reichenbach (1947, 284 ff).

sentence of which it is a token. Frege does not say anything about quotational *sense*. I take it that the quotational sense of a sentence token S is the (ordinary) sense of the expression that we obtain when we enclose S by quotation marks. We grasp this sense if we perceptually recognize S and know that since it is a token of a sentence that is used quotationally it designates the very sentence of which it is a token. The role that perception plays in grasping that sense makes it what Kripke calls an 'acquaintance sense'.

Now consider the following identity claim:

(*Recta**) 'alea iacta est' is the sentence Caesar is alleged to have uttered just before he crossed the Rubicon.

The first of the two expressions that flank the 'is' of identity in (*Recta**) is somehow privileged: it is *diaphanous* or (if you prefer Latin) *translucent*.¹⁸ Let me explain. A term that designates an object of such-and-such a kind is translucent iff one cannot understand it and yet wonder *which* object of that kind it designates. Of the three co-designative terms 'seven', '5271 / 753' and 'the number of deadly sins' only the first is translucent. (You cannot sensibly maintain, 'I have been told that the number of Ursula's children is __, but I have no idea which number that is', if the gap is filled by 'seven'. The other two fillings would be fine.) The term 'the proposition that a vixen is a female fox' is translucent, whereas the co-designative term 'Casimir Lewy's favourite proposition' is not. (You cannot sensibly maintain, 'I have been told that __ is a necessary truth, but I have no idea which proposition that is', if the gap is filled by the first term. The second filling would be acceptable.) Like Kripke I am all in favour of adopting what Quine disapproves of as a 'frankly inequalitarian' attitude toward different ways of specifying one and the same object. What Kripke in his paper calls an "immediately revelatory sense" (pp. 187–189) is the sense of a translucent singular term. (He talks of the "referents" of revelatory senses (pp. 188–189), but strictly speaking, the *bearers* of such senses, the translucent terms, are the items that have a *Bedeutung*.) Translucency is the property of quotational designators which allows Kripke to show that our readiness to take the infinite hierarchy of iterated quotations to be harmless is justified, and translucency is the property of 'that'-clauses which allows Kripke to show that the suspicion many philosophers have cast on the infinite hierarchy of indirect senses is unjustified.¹⁹ I found Kripke's comments on the hierarchies very illuminating and entirely convincing.

¹⁸ In my (1983/2007) I put this in Brentanist terms: only the first designator is 'präsen-tierend' (ch. 4, sections 6–7 and ch. 5, section 4).

¹⁹ "As far as I know", Kripke says (p. 183), "Frege does not ever explicitly consider iterations of 'that' clauses". As a matter of fact, Frege does consider them in a letter dated 28.12.1902 to Russell (1976, 236). Oddly enough, later on Kripke himself quotes another remark from that very page – with a bow to Eva Picardi.

But when it comes to the application of this machinery to hybrid thought-expressions my enthusiasm withers away.

When one reads Frege's statements to the effect that in an utterance of a sentence with one or more indexical elements 'the words need to be supplemented to yield a complete sense' [F₄], one is easily tempted to think that such sentences designate functions: after all, it is of functional expressions, of their senses and of the functions which are their *Bedeutungen* that Frege keeps on telling us that they stand in need of completion,²⁰ In Kripke the function-theoretic account of hybridity (pp. 204, 212) receives its full articulation, but I cannot help thinking that it amounts to an unintended *reductio* not really *ad absurdum* but *ad incredibile*.

Let us inspect what is the key passage of the paper as regards this issue. Referring to the Stockholm variant of my (s1), Kripke says:

[K₅] Included in the expression of the thought is not only the verbiage, but also a time. The real expression of a thought is therefore an ordered pair:

$$\langle L, t \rangle$$

Here *t* is the time of utterance, where L is the piece of language, such as [(s1)].

(fn. 61.) The ordered pair representation is of course my own mathematical transcription of Frege's informal idea that the time is part of the representation [expression?] of the thought. Nothing hangs on it if someone prefers something else.

[K₆] But really, since it is part of the expression of the thought, the time of utterance is, for Frege, an unrecognized piece of language.

[K₇] To what does *t* refer? That is, what is its *Bedeutung*? To make any sense of the passage (sc. [F₁]), it must refer autonomously, that is, to itself . . .

[K₈] The *Sinn* of the corresponding *Gedanke* is therefore that of autonomous designation, just as in the case of quotation.

[K₉] (fn. 60.) . . . Frege says that the sense is part of the expression of the thought. How after all can something be part of the expression of a thought and not have a *Sinn* that is part of the thought? (pp. 201–202).

In [K₅] Kripke reformulates the hybridity view in terms of ordered pairs, but allows for different renderings. Presumably he would concede that Frege's idea that a hybrid thought-expression is a mereological sum of a time, say, and an utterance need not be, or remain, informal.

²⁰ In my (1982, 67ff) I had given in to this temptation, but before 1992 I had become convinced that I'd better overcome it.

According to [K₆] whatever is part of a thought-expression is a piece of *language*.²¹ Of course, the time of an utterance, its producer and its place are not parts of just one particular language. But even linguistic signs can be part of ever so many languages: 'Frege wrote 3 books' and 'Frege schrieb 3 Bücher', for example, contain two such signs. So the assumption that certain items can serve as parts of each and every language is not as bizarre as it may appear at first sight.²²

It is the contention in [K₇] that I look at with a stare of incredulity. How could a time possibly designate anything? A time of utterance is *something one can neither understand nor misunderstand*, so how can it have a Fregean *Bedeutung*?²³ (The same worry arises as regards the producer, and the place, of an utterance of (s₂) and (s₃) respectively: how could a person, how could a locality, possibly have a *Bedeutung*?) To be sure, from the premiss that (s₁) is a functional expression which needs supplementation for becoming a thought-expression that has a *Bedeutung*, the conclusion follows that what supplements it has a *Bedeutung*, and in our case it would have to designate *itself*. But isn't this a good reason for rejecting that premiss?

One might try to meet this challenge by a rhetorical counterquestion along the lines of [K₉]: 'How can something be part of the expression of a true or false thought and yet not have any *Bedeutung*?' But as it stands, this has little force. In denying that in 'The thought that 5 is prime is true' a thought is subsumed under a concept Frege denies that 'is true' has a *Bedeutung*.²⁴ The adverb in 'Unfortunately, Sam smokes' is also *bedeutungslos*, and Frege had implied this in the paragraphs that precede [F₁₋₃]. The judgement-stroke that is part of each and every *Begriffsschriftsatz* does not designate anything. Copula or verb-ending are part of (the predicate of) each and every English sentence that expresses a true or false

²¹ Frege can hardly object to this: in [F₆] he commits himself to the view that an act of ostension can be part of a *sentence*.

²² A referee has objected that proper names are not part of *any* language. I find this view not very plausible. Gender and genitive ending of 'Roma' are the same as those of 'mensa': are we to say that only the latter is a Latin word? 'Rome' and 'Rom' are the English and German versions of the Latin name of the capital of Italy: doesn't this imply that they are part of these languages? 'Rome, open city' is the correct translation of 'Roma, città aperta': isn't coming to know this fact part of an Englishman's learning Italian? The declension of the name 'Roma' in Latin differs from its declension in Italian, and the German, English and Czech genitives of the name of the author of *Begriffsschrift* differ: isn't knowing these facts part of knowing these languages, and doesn't the very description of these facts presuppose that one name belongs to several languages? According to my view, we mildly exaggerate when we say things like 'I don't know a word of Hungarian'. (Rereading Kripke's paper I noticed that I have him on my side here: see his fn. 77.)

²³ Textor, who shares Kripke's conviction that the non-verbal parts of hybrid thought-expressions must be signs, restricts the hybridity view to thought-expressions containing demonstratives, because only demonstrations, being something that can be (mis)understood, are signs. "Why can a demonstration be understood? Because it is like an utterance an action made with communicative intentions" (Textor 2007, 952–955, here 953).

²⁴ Frege, 'Über Sinn und Bedeutung' (1892a, 34) and ('Introduction to Logic', 1906, (1967, 211) and (1979, 194)). One might reasonably wish he hadn't denied this, but that is another issue.

thought, and yet they have no *Bedeutung*. So why should a hybrid thought-expression not also have a part that doesn't designate anything although the thought expressed is either true or false?

[K₈], though repeated in a later passage, must be a slip of the pen, or of the tongue. Thoughts *are* senses, they don't *have* any, hence there is no such thing as the *Sinn* of a *Gedanke*.²⁵ I guess what Kripke wants to say is this: 'The sense that the time of the utterance contributes to the thought expressed in an utterance of [(s1)] is that of an autonomous designator.' This presupposes that the time of an utterance *has* a sense, which brings us to [K₉].

The first statement in [K₉] also baffles me, for Frege never ever said of any sense that it is part of an *expression*. (I suspect another *lapsus linguae*. Frege does say that the sense of a part of the expression of a thought is part of the thought that is expressed.²⁶) As to the second statement in [K₉], I echo my earlier sigh of incomprehension: how could a time possibly have (express) a Fregean sense? A time of utterance is *nothing one might understand or misunderstand*, so how could it have a sense? (The same worry arises as regards the producer, and the place, of an utterance of (s2) and (s3) respectively. To be sure, persons can be (mis)understood, but understanding a person is vastly different from grasping a sense.) What Kripke's rhetorical counterquestion in [K₉] insinuates is that every part of the expression of a thought must have a *Sinn* that is part of the thought. This is incompatible with various Fregean theses. The operator in 'It is true that *p*' does have a sense, but Frege explicitly denies that its sense is part of the thoughts that are expressed by instances of this schema.²⁷ The adverb in 'Unfortunately, Sam smokes' does not have a sense that is part of the thought expressed in an utterance of this sentence, and Frege had said so immediately before passage [F₁₋₃]. The judgement-stroke is part of each and every *Begriffsschriftsatz*, but it does not have a Fregean sense. The copula occurs in ever so many English thought-expressions, and yet it has no Fregean sense. So why should the non-verbal part of a hybrid thought-expression not also lack a Fregean sense although the thought that is expressed is true or false? One rhetorical question is worth another one.

But can we not reformulate Kripke's claims in [K₇] and [K₉] in such a way that my examples lose their sting?²⁸ Let us suppose that what he meant to ascribe to Frege are the following principles:

²⁵ Surprisingly, the slip recurs on p. 212, in a passage of which Kripke says that it was "not in the original transcript of the lecture" (fn. 80).

²⁶ Frege (1893, section 32) and his 1919 letter to Linke (1976, 156). This principle is incompatible with various claims in Frege's 'Logical Investigations': see my (2010, 413 f and 646–657). One of these claims is about the sense of the truth operator: see below.

²⁷ Frege ('My Basic Logical Insights', 1915, (1967, 272) and (1979, 253)). One might wish he hadn't said this (and I would agree), but that is another issue.

²⁸ The following move was suggested by one of the referees.

- (α) Every part of a thought-expression that contributes to determining its *Bedeutung* (truth value) must itself have a *Bedeutung*.
- (β) Every part of a thought-expression that has a *Bedeutung* must have a sense.

The second principle is certainly unassailable. So let us focus on (α). The relative clause distinguishes it from what Kripke insinuates in [K₉]. Neither the judgement-stroke nor the truth operator nor 'unfortunately' and its ilk contribute to determining the *Bedeutung* (truth value) of a thought-expression. If we remove the copula (or the verb-ending) from a sentence the remainder will no longer *have* a truth-value. But the copula is not a sentence-part that contributes to determining *which* truth-value a sentence has. So the fact that none of these sentence-parts has a *Bedeutung* does not refute (α). Now a part of a thought-expression contributes to the *Bedeutung* of the whole, if another thought-expression in which only this part has been exchanged may have a different truth value. Obviously, if it is not permanently raining in Jena, a thought-expression that consists of (s1) and time t may express a truth while a thought-expression that consists of (s1) and another time t* expresses a falsehood. To be sure, the invocation of (α) does nothing to alleviate the worry about 'understanding t', but if this worry can be shrugged off then the invocation of that principle seems to vindicate Kripke's contention that the time of an utterance has to have a *Bedeutung*.

But perhaps appearances are deceptive. In fact, I don't think that this defence works, for Frege has a good reason for not endorsing (α). This reason is to be found in his conception of a predicate. You obtain a predicate from (S) '17 is prime' by removing the singular term and replacing it by a pair of empty brackets: '() is prime'. This expression, mind you: the whole expression, has a *Bedeutung*: it designates a concept. Now Frege does not claim, as Quine does, that the predicate is an indissoluble unit, a seamless whole.²⁹ Copula and general term are genuine constituents of (S). Two pieces of evidence may suffice here: First, in 'Not every number in that row is prime, but 17 is prime' we can *salvo sensu* strip off the general term at the end: '. . . , but 17 is'.³⁰ Second, between copula and general

²⁹ Quine (1974, 220), criticized in the homage to the copula in my (2006, sections I and V).

³⁰ The verb-ending in 'He smokes' is a functional equivalent of the copula. It has the shape of a word in the negation of this sentence, and it assumes the shape of a word when we move from 'She does not smoke, but he smokes' to 'She does not smoke, but he does'. The general term in 'He smokes' is the verb-stem. The copula(-equivalent) takes as input a general term and delivers as output a predicate. Cf. the 1887 preliminary version of 'Über Begriff und Gegenstand', (1967, 101) and (1979, 91), and 'Über Begriff und Gegenstand' (1892b, 194): "Often the word 'is' serves as the copula, as a mere form-word of the *Aussage*. As such it can sometimes be replaced by the verb-ending". In Frege '*Aussage*' (unlike '*Behauptung*') does not mean a speech-act but a part of a sentence, the *Aussageteil*, that is, the predicate. (This was the

term we can insert *salva congruitate* a parenthesis: ‘17 is – as we all know – prime’. Now if you replace the general term in ‘17 is prime’ by ‘even’, this affects the *Bedeutung* (truth-value) of the sentence – in spite of the fact that by itself ‘prime’ has no *Bedeutung*. Since a part of a thought-expression that is itself *bedeutungslos* can contribute to determining the *Bedeutung* of the thought-expression, (α) is not acceptable. So it cannot serve to show that Kripke is right in assigning a *Bedeutung* to the non-verbal part of a hybrid thought-expression.

The conception of hybridity I take to be Frege’s is this. You grasp the thought expressed by a hybrid thought-expression whose verbal part is an utterance of (s1) if and only if you know that the thought expressed is true just in case there is rain in Jena while you are hearing the utterance. The thought contains a mode of presentation of the time of the utterance that is expressible and graspable only at that very time,³¹ and this sub-propositional sense is expressed by a *mixtum compositum* that consists of the present-tense inflection of the verb and the time of utterance. Since it contains a linguistic element, it can be (mis)understood. There is no need for grasping the sense of an autonomous sign that is a time. Or so it seems to me.

You grasp the thought expressed by a hybrid thought-expression whose verbal part is your own utterance of (s2) if and only if you know that the thought expressed is true just in case you yourself have blood-type 0. The thought that is expressed contains a mode of presentation of the speaker that is expressible and graspable only by that very person, and this sub-propositional sense is expressed by a *mixtum compositum* that consists of an utterance of the first-person-singular pronoun and the speaker. There is no need for grasping the sense of an autonomous sign that is a person. Or so it seems to me.

Often a hybrid thought-expression contains a singular term that is *itself* hybrid, as Frege himself points out in our excerpts [F₅] and [F₆]. A hybrid designator containing a token of the first-person-singular pronoun is a translucent singular term: as a whole it has the property Kripke ascribes to its non-verbal part: it has an immediately revelatory sense. A hybrid designator that contains a token of the phrase ‘the present moment’, as in a thought-expression the verbal part of which is an utterance of:

usual nomenclature in German grammar books.) The copula-(equivalent) is the ‘formal’ part of the predicate because the latter owes its ‘content’ entirely to the general term. Cf. my (2006, section I) and (2010, 248–252).

³¹ I think that Kripke is right, as against Evans and others, in using Frege’s account of *ego*-propositions as a model for a truly Fregean account of *nunc*-propositions. (The resulting view was anticipated in Bolzano (1837, vol. IV, section 410, 48).) What Frege on p. 64 of ‘Der Gedanke’ says about ‘today’ (‘here’) sentences and their ‘yesterday’ (‘there’) variants would be appropriate if his *Gedanken* were Strawsonian statements or Kaplanian contents by another name, but it is not in harmony at all with his conception of senses as modes of presentation. We are also agreed as to the needlessness of surrogate senses for other-directed uses of ‘I’. Cf. Kripke (pp. 204–207, 211–215) and my (1995) and (2010, 458–459, 475–481).

(s1*) At the present moment it is raining in Jena,

is also a translucent singular term: it also has an immediately revelatory sense.

Neither the verbal part of a hybrid singular term nor, of course, its non-verbal part is a *function-sign*. Neither the non-verbal part of a hybrid singular term nor, of course, its verbal part is a *singular term*. But the result of combining a word or phrase with a time, a place, a speaker or an act of demonstration is a singular term that by itself designates something. This is a feature that the parts of a hybrid singular term share with the parts of a Fregean predicate: neither copula and general term in '17 is prime', nor verb-ending and verb-stem in 'Sam smokes', designate anything: only *in tandem* do they make up an expression that has a *Bedeutung*.

There are two important differences, not explicitly acknowledged by Frege, between the hybrids in 'pure indexical' cases like (s1–3) and the hybrids in 'demonstrative' cases like (s4). Firstly, the non-verbal part of a hybrid singular term is *itself* a sign if and only if its verbal part is a token of a demonstrative pronoun or of a demonstrative definite description. (Kripke denies the 'only if' part of this claim.) The signs in question are deictic gestures: clearly, they can be (mis)understood. Secondly, in 'demonstrative' cases a hybrid singular term can fail to designate anything. (Recall Macbeth's dagger.) The hybrids in 'pure indexical' cases like (s1–3) are just as immune against the risk of *Bedeutungslosigkeit* as are quotational designators.

Against Russelling Frege

So far I have not commented at all on Kripke's use of the Russellian concept *acquaintance* in [K₃]. It urgently requires comment, for the contention that there is a hidden 'doctrine of acquaintance' in Frege is – Kripke tells us in his summary – one of the 'main points' of his paper:

[K₁₀] Despite their differences over the analysis of descriptions, Frege and Russell are basically more similar than is usually thought. The doctrine of acquaintance is much less explicit in Frege than in Russell, but . . . it is needed for a proper understanding of him (p. 216).

Kripke employs the Russellian notion, if not the doctrine, at various points. In order to grasp the thought that is expressed by a hybrid thought-expression you must stand in the relation of acquaintance to the non-verbal part of that expression. In cases like (s1–3) you must be acquainted with the time, the producer or the place of the utterance, and in cases like (s4) with an act of ostension. Kripke does not tell us much about this relation, but it is clear which conditions have to be satisfied if it is to obtain. You can stand in the relation of acquaintance to a time *t*

or to a place *p* only at *t* and only at *p*, while being alive and kicking, and you cannot stand in that relation to the speaker of an utterance unless you *are* the speaker (p. 212). You can stand in that relation to a gesture only if it is made in your presence. Now Russell characterized acquaintance as that kind of non-propositional knowledge that can be classified as direct awareness of an object.³² Henceforth I shall call acquaintance thus understood *R-acquaintance*.³³ So according to Kripke's Frege, if you want to grasp a thought that is expressed by a hybrid thought-expression then there is a certain time, place, person or gesture you must be R-acquainted with. The pertinent R-acquaintance with a person is self-awareness. So far I entirely agree. By employing the Cantabrigian *notion* in this way one does not commit oneself to a *doctrinal* assimilation of Frege to Russell. It is noteworthy that of all the awarenesses of contextual elements I just listed only one, namely self-awareness, was regarded by Russell (for a while) as a case of R-acquaintance:³⁴ the exclusion of all the others is a piece of Russellian (epistemological) *doctrine*.

In [F₂] Frege calls the knowledge of the 'accompanying circumstance' of an utterance *Kenntnis*. If Kripke is right in taking this knowledge to be a case of R-acquaintance (and I think he is), then there is a tension between [F₂] and the preceding passage. In [F₁] Frege calls the knowledge that is required in the case of the utterance of a temporally indexical sentence knowing-when (*wissen-wann*), and that is, like all cases of knowing wh-, *propositional* knowledge: if you know when the train is to arrive then for some time *t*, you know *that* the train is to arrive at *t*. According to [F₁], you can *now* grasp the thought that is expressed by a certain utterance of (s1) if you know when that utterance was made, so the time of the utterance need not be the *present* time. By extrapolation from [F₁], you can grasp the thought that is expressed in an utterance of (s2) if you know who made it, so you need not be identical with the speaker – and similarly for (s3) and knowing-where. In the case of utterances of (s4) that express a truth or a falsehood the required knowledge might be taken to be knowledge which object the speaker tries to make salient. (Obviously, cases of reference-failure are bound to make trouble here, but let that pass.) These claims may be eminently reasonable, but none of

³² Cf. Russell (1910/1917, 152): "I say that I am acquainted with an object . . . when I am directly aware of the object itself . . . That . . . S has acquaintance with O is essentially the same thing as to say that O is presented to S". Russell (1912/1959, 62): acquaintance is not "knowledge of truths" but "knowledge of things", more precisely, "immediate knowledge of things". We can have immediate knowledge not only of 'particulars' but also of 'universals': (1910/1917, 154–155), (1912/1959, 58–63).

³³ R-acquaintance and acquaintance are vastly different. Happily, we are not all the time 'directly aware' of all those with whom we are acquainted.

³⁴ Affirmed in Russell (1910/1917, 162), denied in Russell (1914/1956, 163 f.), cf. fn. [1917] to his (1910/1917, 162).

them captures what Frege wants to say, if Kripke's and my (partly reconstructive³⁵) reading is correct. The tension is not due to the fact that Frege uses the word 'Kenntnis' in [F₂], for as we shall soon see, a *Kenntnis* may very well be propositional.³⁶ The tension is due to the assumption that the *Kenntnis* Frege is here talking about is a case of R-acquaintance.

I wonder why Kripke calls senses of translucent singular terms not only immediately revelatory but also "acquaintance-revelatory" (p. 199). You cannot grasp the sense of a translucent singular term without immediately knowing which object it presents. But knowledge-which is propositional knowledge while R-acquaintance is not, and when Kripke explains "(immediately) revelatory" (pp. 187–189), he has illuminating things to say about 'knowing wh-' phrases, but the notion of R-acquaintance is nowhere invoked.

Surprisingly, Kripke says that we are "*introspectively acquainted*" with *senses* (pp. 199, 214). I would have thought that only *Eigenpsychisches*, only your own mental acts and states have a claim to being introspectively accessible to you, so sense-data (if there are such things) are in contention for that epistemological title but certainly not Fregean senses. In the next quotation we become witness to the transformation of Gottlob Frege into Gottrand Fressel:

[K₁₁] On [my] interpretation, not only does Frege, at least implicitly, have a doctrine of acquaintance; but also, the list of objects of acquaintance that he would accept is not so vastly different from Russell's final position . . . [Russell ends his paper 'On Denoting'] with his well-known conclusion that 'in every proposition that we can apprehend . . . all the constituents are really entities with which we have immediate acquaintance'. Under the pressure of the requirements of his semantical theory, the list of such entities becomes progressively much narrower. One's own sense-data, perhaps one's own self, and abstract entities such as universals, are the objects of acquaintance and the constituents of propositions. One could never be acquainted with Mont Blanc, with all its snowfields, nor could it be a constituent of a proposition. There is an unconditional surrender to Frege on this point. That Russell's ultimate list of propositional constituents would be acceptable to Frege, or close to it, . . . might become clearer if we consider Frege's relatively late paper 'Der Gedanke'. (pp. 199–200).

³⁵ See footnote 31 above.

³⁶ Furthermore, in the standard usage of this word even cases of non-propositional *Kenntnis* are hardly ever cases of R-acquaintance. Consider Frege's example in 'Der Gedanke', (1918, 65): it could be true of Rudolf Lingens at time T that he 'knows Dr. Lauben personally (*persönlich kennt*)', in other words: that he is one of his acquaintances, although at T Lauben is in Jena and Lingens is in Ghana.

Two lists are ‘vastly different’ if no item registered on one of them is also registered on the other. *Pace* Kripke, this is exactly what holds of Frege’s and Russell’s lists. A Fregean proposition consists of nothing but senses. In 1918 Frege is as strongly committed to this as he was at the time when he exchanged letters with Russell. Now sense-data, selves and universals are not senses. So Russell’s final list is by no means ‘close to being acceptable’ to Frege. He would find only small consolation in the fact that Russell finally expelled mountains and snow-fields from his list. He would still complain, as the Caterpillar did to Alice, that Russell’s list is ‘wrong from beginning to end’.

At the end of his paper Kripke ‘restates’ what he had called at the beginning its ‘main moral’ (p. 183, n. 6):

[K₁₂] There is in a sense [*pace* Russell] a ‘backward road’ from references to senses. For everyone who specifies a reference must do so in some way. Then, by her awareness of how she has specified the reference, she is aware of the way the reference is fixed, and hence aware of the sense (p. 215).

Let me try to explain this point by means of an example. When you say:

—: ‘Redundancy’ designates superfluity,

you specify the *Bedeutung* of that word correctly, and you do it in a way that *displays* or *shows* its sense.³⁷ When you say:

—: ‘Redundancy’ designates the property Ramsey ascribed to ‘It is true that’,

what you say is no less true, but this time you do not specify the *Bedeutung* of ‘redundancy’ in a sense-displaying way. If you had said:

—: ‘Redundancy’ designates redundancy,

you would also have specified the *Bedeutung* of this word in a sense-displaying way, for surely ‘redundancy’ *means*: redundancy. But of course, the homophonic specification of the *Bedeutung* of a word is singularly unhelpful for somebody who wants to be told what the sense of that word is.

How is ‘awareness’ in [K₁₂] to be understood? Presumably it is just another word for R-acquaintance.³⁸ Now R-acquaintance is a kind of knowledge, so let us replace ‘awareness’ by ‘knowledge’ and see where we end up. If one knows in

³⁷ Kripke takes here a leaf out of Dummett’s book (1973, 227), quoting it (p. 182, n. 6), as Gareth Evans did in his (1982, 26 and 35). But Kripke develops it in a way that is not be found in Dummett.

³⁸ In the passage that is summarized in [K₁₂] Kripke speaks of “direct acquaintance” (you find this kind of pleonasm also in Russell) but also of “introspective acquaintance” (p. 199), and on the final page of his paper Kripke again presents “Russellian acquaintance . . . with mental states” as a basic ingredient of Frege’s philosophy of language (p. 217).

which (sc. sense-displaying) way one has specified the *Bedeutung* of an expression E, one knows the sense of E. But what *is* knowing the sense of E?

Let us look at the way Frege uses (the nominalization of) this phrase in the following argument:

[F₁₀] If I predicatively attach the word 'salzig' to the words 'das Meerwasser', I form a sentence that expresses a thought . . . Knowledge of the sense of the words (*Kenntnis des Sinnes der Worte*) 'ist salzig' is required for an understanding (*Verständnis*) of the sentence, since that sense makes an essential contribution to the thought ('My Basic Logical Insights', 1915, (1967, 271) and (1979, 251)).

Is knowing the sense of the words 'ist salzig'³⁹ knowing *that which* is the sense of those words – is it being acquainted, perhaps even introspectively, with that sense?⁴⁰ Every anglophone reader of this paper is acquainted with that sense, for it is identical with the sense of 'is salt', but there might be one or two among my readers who do not know the sense of the German predicate, and their R-acquaintance with (that which is) the sense of this predicate will not help them to understand the sentence 'Das Meerwasser ist salzig'. In the context of [F₁₀] Frege is concerned with the very special character of 'is true': that's why he focuses on the predicate in the sea-water sentence. But surely we can replace in the long second sentence of [F₁₀] the quotational designator of the predicate *salva veritate* by that of the subject. Had he made both points, Frege would have gone on to claim that knowing the senses of these two parts of the sentence suffices for understanding the sentence. But this would be glaringly wrong if knowing the sense of E were the same thing as being acquainted with (that which is) the sense of E. In fact, knowing the sense of E is knowing *what* the sense of E is. In this phrase the word 'what' is not a relative ('that which') but an *interrogative*, or as Austin would have said at this point, 'Latin *quid*, not *quod*'.⁴¹ This explains why the argument:

- : She knows the sense of 'superfluity'.
The sense of 'redundancy' is identical with the sense of 'superfluity'.
(?) So, she knows the sense of 'redundancy'

is fallacious: she might know what the sense of 'superfluity' is though she has no inkling what the sense of 'redundancy' is.

Now in a simple case like this we can also *say* in so many words what the sense of the expression is:

³⁹ Note that Frege carefully avoids ascribing sense to the the *general term* he just mentioned.

⁴⁰ This question is answered affirmatively in Levine (2004, 259). He even translates 'Kenntnis' as 'acquaintance'.

⁴¹ Austin tried to teach us this lesson already in his (1946, 96 f).

(Σ) The sense of ‘redundancy’ is *superfluity*.

In the context of (Σ) the final word designates (not the property of being superfluous but) its own sense.⁴² This dovetails with Frege’s theory of *Oratio obliqua* and Kripke’s development thereof. Unlike the co-designative expression ‘the sense of “superfluity”’ the final word in (Σ) is a translucent designator of the sense of ‘redundancy’ resp. ‘superfluity’ – or, to use Kripke’s language, the sense of this designator is immediately revelatory. A monoglot Hungarian who has looked up an English-English dictionary might know that the sense of ‘redundancy’ is identical with that of ‘superfluity’ and yet not have the foggiest idea what ‘redundancy’ means. But if you know that the sense of ‘redundancy’ is *superfluity*, or that the sense of ‘redundancy’ is *redundancy*, you know what the sense of ‘redundancy’ is.⁴³

All in all, I think that the ‘main moral’ of Kripke’s paper does not depend on Russelling Frege.*

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⁴² Compare the notorious footnote on proper names in ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’: surely Frege does not want to say that the sense of ‘Aristotle’ is somebody’s pupil and somebody’s teacher.

⁴³ Similarly, one can know that A’s age is the same as B’s age without having a clue how old A is, but one cannot know that A’s age in years is 75 without thereby knowing how old A is.

* In 2009 I presented earlier versions of this paper at workshops in Manchester and Berlin and at the GAP conference in Bremen. Questions, objections and constructive suggestions by John Divers, Miguel Hoeltje, Andreas Kemmerling, Stephan Kraemer, Kevin Mulligan, Tobias Rosefeldt, Ian Rumfitt, Mark Sainsbury, Mark Textor and two anonymous referees helped to improve it: I thank you all. Very special thanks must go of course to the *sine quibus non* of this paper, Dagfinn Føllesdal, for calling some of my writings to Kripke’s attention, and to Saul Kripke for commenting so incisively on them: if I am now a bit clearer about my position, it is largely his fault.

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