

# INTENTIONS AND WHAT IS SAID

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## Abstract

In her defense of minimalism, Borg (2007) argues that one of its distinctive features is *formalism*, i.e., the idea that every contextual contribution to semantic content is formally tractable. In virtue of this, speaker intentions must be excluded, since they are a non-formal aspect of a context of utterance. In particular, Borg seems to be worried about the fact that “there is simply no limit on the amount of contextual evidence which could turn out to be relevant in assigning an intentional state to another” (Borg 2007, p. 356). In our talk, we will discuss whether Borg’s concern on speaker intentions is really justified. Saul (2002) elaborates Grice’s idea that there are some constraints on what is said. As Borg shows, we can use words with non-standard meanings; however, this does not mean that a speaker can succeed in saying whatever she means. It seems that a crucial constraint on what is said is that intentions must be *recognised* by the participants to the conversation. Once we point out such constraint, maybe we can assuage Borg’s concern on speaker intentions.