

Scientific and Didactic Relation

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*Name of Tutor* Margherita Benzi

*Cycle* XXXIV

*Suggested name of the Supervisor (IF different from the tutor)(for 1<sup>st</sup> year students)*

Vincenzo CRUPI

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*(A) Didactics*

- 1) List of institutional or curricular courses
  - 2) List of working papers written in those occasions
  - 3) list of other courses you have followed
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*(B) Research and diffusion*

- 1) List of seminars and conferences you have participated to
  - 2) List of Talks (in some of the above-mentioned conferences)
  - 3) List of published or submitted papers
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*(C) Project of the dissertation*

- 1) Update of the planning of your research program

(A) *Didactics*

1) List of institutional or curricular courses:

- Rolling Seminar: “Abstract & Concrete”.
- Classics of Analytic Philosophy: Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein.
- Lectures in Philosophy of Mind: The Philosophy of Perceptions.
- Lectures in Logic.
- LLC Reading Group.
- LLC Talks & Seminars.
- “Science & More” Talks.

2) List of working papers written in those occasions:

- “The Interpretation of Probability in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*” (Classics).
- “Fiction, Imagination, and the Normativity of the *Dutch Book* Argument” (Rolling Seminar).
- TBD – working paper on Philosophy of Perception.
- Logic Exam: passed with 7+

3) List of other courses I have followed:

- Logic (MA course), prof. Andrea Iacona.
- Theories of Rationality (MA course), prof. Vincenzo Crupi.

(B) *Research and Diffusion*

1) List of seminars and conferences I have participated to:

- *Economic Behaviours: Models, Measurements, and Policies*: Lake Como Summer School. (Como, 30 June – 5 July 2019).
- *Conference by Women in Philosophy*. (Groningen, 24<sup>th</sup> June 2019).
- *FEW 2019: Formal Epistemology Workshop*. (Turin, 19-21 June 2019).
- *Fiction and Imagination*: SIFA Midterm Conference. (Turin, 17-18 June 2019).
- *New Perspectives on the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception*: Turin-Bochum joint workshop. (Turin, 10-11 December 2019).
- *Preference-based Modelling in Economics*. Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Sciences. (London School of Economics, 10<sup>th</sup> November 2018).

2) List of talks:

- *Relevance Uncertainty in Savage's Expected Utility Theory*. (Lake Como Summer School).
- (Discussant) *Decoy effects in intertemporal and probabilistic choices*. (Lake Como Summer School).
- *Narratives and the Normativity of the Rational Agent*. (SIFA Midterm Conference).
- *Voting on Mandatory Vaccinations: A Contextualisation of the Legitimacy of Referendums*. (Conference by Women in Philosophy).
- *Scienza e Democrazia*. (L'Ornitorinco Laboratorio Culturale, 22 May 2019).
- (Lecture) *An Introduction to Social Choice Theory*. (Università del Piemonte Orientale, 17 April 2019).

(C) *Project of the dissertation*

1) Update of the planning of your research program:

My research takes off from the identification of a type of uncertainty in Savage's Expected Utility Theory that undermines the normative import of its prescribed outcomes. I plan to present the problem in the following way. I introduce Savage's framework with a focus on the framing of decision problems, and I claim that expected utility is relative to this framing. This relativity implies that the same act may be preferred under one framing but not under another, and it gives rise to *relevance uncertainty*. To avoid this, a traditional notion of rationality would prescribe the act with the highest expected utility under the optimal decision framing. However, such optimal framing is out of the reach of human agents. Yet, I contend that to be adequately normative a theory must be applicable, i.e. its requirements must be realistic. Thus, insofar as Savage's theory requires optimal framing, then relevance uncertainty undermines its normativity.

My notion of "relevance uncertainty" has at least some family resemblance with other problems appearing in different contexts under different names, like the "Search problem" or Savage's own small/grand worlds distinction. A crucial contribution of my research should then be to state the notion and its relations with neighbouring concepts as clearly as possible and in the most theory-neutral way available, to widen its scope beyond Savage's specific framework.

The problem of relevance uncertainty is particularly interesting from a social perspective. If different framings can lead to different results, then different agents may have different positions on the same decision problem simply because of their framings. If this is so, then relevance uncertainty could be a source of disagreement. In social contexts, agents may be required to defend their result and thus their framing, and support the rationality of their procedure. This is where the failure of normativity shows more patently. In such situations, the theory should be able to provide normative criteria to judge the rationality of a framing over others.

The solution to the problem must then come in the form of normative criteria for the rational selection of relevant elements in the decision problem. In order to do so, any notion of rationality based on optimality must be given up, in favour of some notion that includes considerations of efficiency and of the cognitive costs of processing irrelevant factors. Thus, the cognitive sciences may provide fertile research grounds for a normatively adequate decision theory.