Categoria: Curriculum Episteme
Seminars of Philosophy of Perception, Mind, and Language
Monday, 12 February,¬†2018 – h. 13.30
Via Festa del Perdono, 7
Against the Speaker-intention Theory of Demonstratives
It is commonly held that an utterance of a bare demonstrative, such as ‚Äúthat‚ÄĚ, refers to an object o only if the speaker intends it to refer to o.¬† First, I argue that the theory is best formulated as a thesis concerning the conditions under which a formal context pertains to an utterance.¬† Second, I pose three objections to this theory:¬† It is question-begging; it is psychologically implausible; and it is inconsistent with the plausible assumption that thoughts too can contain bare demonstratives.¬† Finally, I sketch an alternative theory of the reference of demonstratives, according to which the reference of a demonstrative is that which is identified by an all-things-considered judgment that takes into account various accessibility criteria.