23 Ottobre 2017, GENOVA, Aula Magna Scienze Umanistiche, via Balbi 2, h. 11-13
Categoria: Curriculum Episteme, Curriculum Theoretic

Jaszczol-annoucement.pdf

Kasia Jaszcolt   is professor of Linguistics and Philosophy of Language at the University of Cambridge,  Director of Studies in Linguistics at Newnham College, Cambridge. She was President of the Cambridge Institute of Language Research and Head of Department of Linguistics 2009-11. In 2012 she was elected Member of Academia Europaea. Here below a short  abstract of the talk:

 

The Demise of the Concept of Time:
Linguistic Evidence and Metaphysical Implications

Kasia M. Jaszczolt
University of Cambridge
https://cambridge.academia.edu/KasiaJaszczolt
http://people.pwf.cam.ac.uk/kmj21

Abstract

Investigation into the reality ofinto metaphysical time (M), the human concept of time (E), and temporal reference in natural language (L), entertaining the possibility of what I call a ‘horizontal reduction’ (L>E>M) and ‘vertical reduction’ (through modal supervenience; Jaszczolt 2009, 2017a,b). I present my theory of temporalityL/E as epistemic modality, drawing on evidence from the L domain and its correlates in the E and M domains. On this view, the human concept of time is a complex, ‘molecular’ concept and can be broken down into primitive concepts that are modal in nature. Put simply, on the level of the conceptual building blocks, the concept of time features as degrees of epistemic commitment to representations of states of affairs. I present some evidence from tensed and tenseless languages in support of this modal view (endorsing the L>E path) and point out its compatibility with the view of real time as metaphysical modality (endorsing the E>M path). Next, I move to the topic of the passage of time and the subjective ‘feeling of the rate of the passage of time’ and show how they can be accounted for in my modal reductionist view.  I conclude by speculating on the challenges for a reductionist perspective of this kind and remark on the place for A-theoretic concepts in this essentially B-theoretic view (McTaggart 1908).

Selected references:

Grice, P. 2001. Aspects of Reason. Ed. by R. Warner. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Jaszczolt, K. M. 2009. Representing Time: An Essay on Temporality as Modality. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Jaszczolt, K. M. 2013. ‘Temporality and epistemic commitment: An unresolved question’. In: K. M.
Jaszczolt & L. de Saussure (eds), Time: Language, cognition, and reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 193-209.
Jaszczolt, K. M. 2016. Meaning in Linguistic Interaction: Semantics, Metasemantics, Philosophy of
Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jaszczolt, K. M. 2017a. ‘Time, perspective and semantic representation’ Language and Cognition
https://doi.org/10.1017/langcog.2017.7. Published online 5 May 2017.
Jaszczolt, K. M. 2017b. ‘Temporal reference’. In: A. Barron, Y. Gu and G. Steen (eds). TheRoutledge
Handbook of Pragmatics. London: Routledge. 227-240.
McTaggart, J. E. 1908. ‘The unreality of time’. Mind 17. Reprinted in: J. E. McTaggart. 1934. Philosophical
Studies. London: E. Arnold. 110-31.
Torrengo, G. 2017. ‘Feeling the passing of time’. Journal of Philosophy 114. 165-188.