EPILOG Seminar 2021. Semantic and Experimental Aspects of lying
Coordinator Massimiliano Vignolo (massimiliano.vignolo@unige.it)
To have access to TEAMS application, where the meetings will be organized, please write Massimiliano)
(see also http://filosofia.dafist.unige.it/?page_id=184)
1° set: 4 meeings on semantic aspects of the concept of lyingÂ
22 February 2021, ore 10:00-13:00
Lying e what is said
Saul, J. (2012). Lying, misleading, and what is said. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (capitoli 2, 3)
8 March 2021, ore 10:00-13:00
Lying e what is said
Stokke, A. (2018). Lying and insincerity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (capitoli 4, 5 (fino a 5.10 compreso))
22 March 2021, ore 10:00-13:00
Objections to Saul e Stokke
Siu, C. (2020). Tipper is ready but he is not strong enough: minimal proposition, question under discussion, and what is said. Philosophical Studies 77:2577–2584
Stokke, A. (2013). Saying too little and saying too much. Disputatio, 35: 81-91.
Van Elswyk, P. (2020). Deceiving without answering. Philosophical Studies, 177: 1157-1173.
12 April, ore 10:00-13:00
Lying with content different from what is said
Viebahn, E. 2017: Non-literal lies. Erkenntnis 82: 1367–1380.
Viebahn, E. (2020). Lying with presuppositions. Noûs, 54:3: 731-751.
2° set: 3 meetings on experimental data on the concept of lying
3 May  2021, ore 10:00-13:00
On the intention of lying:
Rutschmann, R., & Wiegmann, A. (2017). No need for an intention to deceive? Challenging the traditional definition of lying. Philosophical Psychology, 30(4), 434-453.
17 May  2021, ore 10:00-13:00
On the truth conditions of the proposition:
Turri, A., & Turri, J. (2015). The truth about lying. Cognition, 138, 161-168
31 May  2021, ore 10:00-13:00
On implicit/explicit Distinction:
Wiegmann, A., Rutschmann, R., & Willemsen, P. (2017). Empirically investigating the concept of lying. Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 34, 591-609.