EPILOG Seminar 2021. Semantic and Experimental Aspects of lying

Coordinator Massimiliano Vignolo (massimiliano.vignolo@unige.it)

To have access to  TEAMS application, where the  meetings will be organized, please write Massimiliano)
(see also http://filosofia.dafist.unige.it/?page_id=184)

1¬į set: 4 meeings on semantic aspects of the concept of lying¬†

22 February 2021, ore 10:00-13:00
Lying e what is said
Saul, J. (2012). Lying, misleading, and what is said. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (capitoli 2, 3)

8 March 2021, ore 10:00-13:00
Lying e what is said
Stokke, A. (2018). Lying and insincerity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (capitoli 4, 5 (fino a 5.10 compreso))

22 March 2021, ore 10:00-13:00
Objections to Saul e Stokke
Siu, C. (2020). Tipper is ready but he is not strong enough: minimal proposition, question under discussion, and what is said.¬†Philosophical Studies¬†77:2577‚Äď2584
Stokke, A. (2013). Saying too little and saying too much. Disputatio, 35: 81-91.
Van Elswyk, P. (2020). Deceiving without answering. Philosophical Studies, 177: 1157-1173.

12 April, ore 10:00-13:00
Lying with content different from what is said
Viebahn, E. 2017: Non-literal lies.¬†Erkenntnis¬†82: 1367‚Äď1380.
Viebahn, E. (2020). Lying with presuppositions.¬†No√Ľs, 54:3: 731-751.

2¬į set: 3 meetings on experimental data on the concept of lying

3 May  2021, ore 10:00-13:00
On the intention of lying:
Rutschmann, R., & Wiegmann, A. (2017). No need for an intention to deceive? Challenging the traditional definition of lying. Philosophical Psychology, 30(4), 434-453.

17 May  2021, ore 10:00-13:00
On the truth conditions of the proposition:
Turri, A., & Turri, J. (2015). The truth about lying. Cognition, 138, 161-168

31 May  2021, ore 10:00-13:00
On implicit/explicit Distinction:
Wiegmann, A., Rutschmann, R., & Willemsen, P. (2017). Empirically investigating the concept of lying. Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 34, 591-609.